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servants: A ﬁeld experiment in
Zambia
The civil service – public cadres of bureaucrats, local
administrators, teachers and health workers – is a key
component of the state’s capacity to govern and provide public
goods. In the effort to create an effective civil service, states face
key questions regarding how to recruit, train and motivate
competent agents to ensure their high performance and long-
term retention.
In 2010, the Government of Zambia launched a new civil
service cadre: the community health assistant (CHA). Recruited
from local communities, trained and then posted back in their
communities, community health assistants are a policy response
to the shortage of formal health workers in rural areas of the
country. Together with fellow researchers at Harvard, I have
collaborated with the Zambian Government’s Ministry of
Health since the inception of the CHA program, when the first
cohort of 307 CHAs was recruited from 160 communities in 48
districts across the country. Thereafter, the Ministry of Health
will recruit 1,000 community health assistants per year for five
years, totaling 5,000 CHAs nationwide.
Using a randomised experiment we evaluate strategies to
recruit, motivate and retain agents in this civil service post. The
experiment was designed to measure the practical relevance of a
particular concern of the Ministry, namely whether providing
career opportunities came at the expense of community
attachment and interest for the social good, therefore reducing
motivation and performance.
The key idea is that pro-social preferences can interact with
other sources of motivation such as the attainment of material
benefits through financial gain or career advancement.
Understanding the nature of this interaction is crucial to
identify how best to attract and motivate agents engaged in
public services delivery. The observation that material
incentives are less common in organizations that deliver public
services is consistent with the fact that pro-social preferences
can be an alternative source of motivation to material
incentives, but it does not provide information on how the two
interact. Do material benefits leverage pro-social preferences
and attract qualified agents who deliver public services
effectively? Or do they crowd out pro-social preferences and
attract agents who solely pursue their private interests at the
expense of service quality?
To answer these questions we experimentally vary the salience
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To answer these questions we experimentally vary the salience
of career benefits vs. social benefits across all 48 districts when
recruiting agents. We then follow the entire first cohort from
application to the field and measure impacts at every stage: we
collect information on the skills and pro-social preferences of
the applicants, analyze how they are selected and, finally, how
they perform once hired during the course of one year.
We find that the different recruitment strategies indeed matter
at all stages: they attract different types at application stage,
they influence panels at selection stage, and they affect
performance in the field.
At the application stage, we find that applicants to both
treatments display strong pro-social preferences, thus suggesting
that making career benefits salient does not displace pro-social
motivation. However, making career incentives salient attracts
applicants who are more qualified (as measured by high school
test scores) and have a stronger scientific background (measured
by the number of natural sciences courses taken and passed). The
differences are driven by the fact that career incentives attract
more qualified applicants as opposed to discouraging less
qualified applicants. This has important implications for the skill
level of those who are eventually selected for the job as qualified
candidates can be chosen only if they apply.
At the deployment stage, we compare the performance of CHAs
in their main tasks: household visits, community mobilisation
meetings and visiting patients at the health post. We find that
CHAs recruited with career incentives conduct 26% more
household visits and organize twice as many community
meetings while seeing the same number of patients at the health
post. Supplementary evidence suggests that the difference does
not come at the expense of quality measured by the length of the
visits, targeting of women and children, or the balance between
new and repeat visits
After one year, retention rates are identical in both groups but
longer-term data is required to establish the effects on retention
in the long-run. If retention is lower in the ‘career’ treatment,
the welfare implications of using the career poster rest on the
value of strong performers in communities for a shorter period
versus weaker performers for a longer period (as well as what
happens to strong performers when they leave, and the value
they might bring to the health sector if they build further skills
and remain within the Ministry of Health). Regardless of the
retention outcomes, however, the findings clearly illustrate that
there is no tradeoff between career incentives, skills and social
values. Providing career opportunities attracts more skilled
individuals who perform better and seem to be equally socially
motivated.
The findings provide empirical insight into how governments
can implement and manage large-scale civil service initiatives. In
addition, it is hoped that they will advance theoretical
understanding about the complex interplay between job design,
incentives, selection and performance.
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